

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9815

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 10117

FOR: ASSISTANT SECRETARIES VEST, EUR, AND CARTER, P

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SOPN, UR, US
SUBJECT: NEWSWEEK INTERVIEW WITH AMBASSADOR

1. FOLLOWING IS COMPLETE EDITED VERSION OF INTERVIEW AMBASSADOR
GAVE TO NEWSWEEK MOSCOW CORRESPONDENT FRED COLEMAN JULY 12.
ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT RAN TO APPROXIMATELY 4000 WORDS, WHICH
COLEMAN CUT DOWN TO VERSION SUBMITTED HERewith. COLEMAN INFORMS
EMBASSY HE TELEXED INTERVIEW TO NEW YORK EARLY HOURS OF JULY 14
WITH HOPE IT WILL MAKE ISSUE SCHEDULED TO GO ON SALE JULY 18.
COLEMAN ADDS THAT NEW YORK EDITORS MAY DECIDE TO MAKE FURTHER
CUTS, BUT THAT HE HAS INSTRUCTED THEM TO MAINTAIN BALANCE
OF OVERALL INTERVIEW.

2. (BEGIN TEXT) Q. HOW DO YOU VIEW YOUR JOB? DO YOU HAVE A
POLICY MAKING ROLE?

A. I FEEL THE EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY USED
DOWN THROUGH THE YEARS, NOT JUST THE AMBASSADOR BUT THE VERY
TALENTED STAFF. SO I'VE FELT THAT ONE OF THE JOBS I MIGHT USEFULLY
DO HERE IS TO TRY TO GET THE EMBASSY BACK IN A POSITION IN WHICH
IT CAN MAKE A REAL INPUT TO THE POLICY FORMULATION PROCESS BACK
HOME. BECAUSE I THINK FRANKLY WE HAVE QUITE A BIT TO CONTRIBUTE.
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NOW CERTAINLY PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER
KNEW THIS WHEN I CAME HERE (DECEMBER 1976). I CONVEYED MY CONCERNS
ABOUT THIS TO THE NEW TEAM, AND I THINK IN ALL MODESTY WE'VE MADE
SOME PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING THIS GOAL.

Q. ARE YOU SAYING THERE WAS AN IMBALANCE IN SOVIET-AMERICAN
CONTACTS THROUGH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN IN WASHINGTON IN THE

PAST AND THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOW PUSH FOR MORE CONTACT
HERE BETWEEN YOU AND SOVIET LEADERS AS A WAY OF INCREASING UNDERSTAND

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ING?

A. YES. PRECISELY. THERE HAS BEEN A GROSS IMBALANCE. NOW
I DON'T SAY THIS IN ANY CRITICAL WAY. I HAVE GREAT ADMIRATION FOR
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN. HE IS ONE OF THE WORLD'S MOST EFFECTIVE
DIPLOMATS. BUT I THINK IT'S WRONG, NOT ONLY FROM OUR POINT OF
VIEW BUT ALSO FROM MOSCOW'S TO HAVE ONLY ONE CHANNEL OF
COMMUNICATION. AND THAT'S ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL REASONS WHY I THINK
WE OUGHT TO USE THIS CHANNEL AS WELL.

Q. WAS YOUR JULY 4 SPEECH ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH THE SOVIETS
REFUSED TO TELEVISION, CLEARED WITH WASHINGTON OR DO YOU HAVE LEEWAY
TO EXPRESS YOURSELF ON YOUR OWN ON SUCH SENSITIVE MATTERS?

A. I THINK WITH THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT, I MIGHT HAVE
CLEARED THIS WITH WASHINGTON. I DID NOT OF COURSE ANTICIPATE
THE SORT OF FLAP THAT THIS CAUSED. BUT GENERALLY SPEAKING,
I DON'T FEEL I HAVE TO CLEAR ANYTHING WITH WASHINGTON IF IT IS
SIMPLY A RECITAL OF KNOWN POSITIONS, AS IN FACT THIS WAS.

Q. HOW DOES THE CURRENT CHILL IN U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS
AFFECT THE DAILY WORK OF YOU AND THE EMBASSY STAFF?

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A. I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT NOT TO EXAGGERATE THE POOR STATE
OF OUR RELATIONS AT THE PRESENT TIME. OBVIOUSLY IT WOULD BE
MUCH MORE PLEASANT AND EASIER TO DO BUSINESS IF ALL OUR PEOPLE
HAD COMPLETE FREEDOM TO TRAVEL IN THIS COUNTRY WITHOUT BLOCKAGE
BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES, IF WE HAD COMPLETE AND FREE ACCESS TO
ALL SEGMENTS OF THE SOVIET POPULATION. BUT THAT IS NOT IN THE
CARDS. WE HAVE TO EXPECT THIS SORT OF THING BECAUSE OF THE BASIC
ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE WITH MOSCOW. BUT HAVING SAID THAT,
I THINK I OUGHT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT ALL KINDS OF BUSINESS IS GOING
ON BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE SOVIETS. WE HAVE FOR EXAMPLE ABOUT
A DOZEN BILATERAL COMMISSIONS (ON SCIENTIFIC, MEDICAL ETC.
COOPERATION) WHICH ARE VERY BUSY. ON THE PERSONAL CONTACT LEVEL,
JUST OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS I HAVE SEEN MR. BREZHNEV TWICE.

Q. WHERE DOES THE MICROWAVE/HEALTH QUESTION STAND NOW?

A. THE PROBLEM IS NOT ON THE SAME MAGNITUDE THAT IT WAS SAY
2 YEARS AGO. IT IS WHAT I CALL MANAGEABLE. THE INTENSITY OF THE
BEAM IS WAY DOWN, WELL WITHIN THE SAFETY MARGIN. WE ARE NOT
CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE BEAM ON THE MORALE OF THE
EMBASSY. BUT, I THINK THIS IS AN UNCIVILIZED INHUMAN THING TO DO
AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SHOULD TURN IT OFF. WE REMIND THEM

OF OUR STRONG VIEWS ON THIS AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY.

Q. WHAT IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO DEAL WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS ON A PERSONAL LEVEL?

A. I THINK IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS YOU FOLLOW THE SAME BASIC RULES OF BEHAVIOR THAT YOU FOLLOW WITH ANYBODY ELSE AROUND THE WORLD AND THAT IS YOU ARE COMPLETELY FRANK IN EXPOSING YOUR POSITIONS AND YOU REFLECT AS MUCH AS YOU CAN A SENSITIVITY TO THEIR POSITIONS.

Q. WHERE IS DETENTE GOING?

A. SALT IN MANY WAYS IS THE LINCHOPIN OF DETENTE AS THE
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SOVIETS PERCEIVE IT. IF WE ARE NOT SUCCESSFUL IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON SALT THEN I THINK WE WILL SEE A DECIDED COOLING OF OUR RELATIONS, EVEN MORE SO THAN WE HAVE SEEN IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS. WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON SALT? IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE TO SAY AT THE MOMENT. WE DID HAVE A SUCCESSFUL MEETING IN GENEVA IN THE SENSE THAT WE WORKED OUT A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS. WE DID HAVE SOME DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE BETWEEN US, BUT FRANKLY WE DIDN'T GET VERY FAR INTO THIS. SO THE MAJOR PART OF THE JOB LIES AHEAD OF US. I THINK WE WOULD JUST BE KIDDING OURSELVES IF WE DID NOT RECOGNIZE THAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US ON THESE GUT ISSUES ARE VERY WIDE INDEED. BOTH SIDES FEEL STRONGLY THAT A SALT AGREEMENT IS IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST AND THEREFORE I WOULD HOPE THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD SHOW THE NECESSARY SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9816

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NOW ON THE BROADER QUESTION OF DETENTE AND ITS APPLICATION ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, FRANKLY I DON'T THINK THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL IN EXTENDING THE CONCEPT, ABOVE ALL TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA. IN AFRICA THEIR POLICY SEEMS TO BE BASED LARGELY ON ARMS TRANSFERS, AND THIS HAS GIVEN RISE TO SITUATIONS OF INSECURITY, INSTABILITY, AND EVEN HOSTILITIES. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, I THINK UP UNTIL THE PRESENT TIME THEIR ROLE HAS NOT BEEN A VERY HELPFUL ONE. I FEEL STRONGLY THAT IN 1973, AT THE TIME OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR (TOON WAS AMBASSADOR TO TEL AVIV BEFORE MOSCOW) THEY WERE IN SERIOUS VIOLATION OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WHICH WE ARRIVED AT IN 1972. I DON'T SAY THE NECESSARILY MASTERMINDED THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES BUT I FEEL STRONGLY THAT THEY WERE AWARE OF THE PLANNED MOVES BY THE ARAB STATES AND THEREFORE THEY SHOULD HAVE INFORMED US IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. NOW THEIR MAIN CONCERN IS TO GET BACK INTO THE ACT ON THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY HAVE A KEEN INTEREST IN RECONVENING GENEVA AND WE ARE COMMITTED TO THAT AS WELL OURSELVES. I CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THEY WILL PROVE TO BE A LITTLE BIT MORE HELPFUL IN THE PREPARATORY PHASE FOR GENEVA, AS WELL AS AT A GENEVA CONFERENCE ITSELF, IF IN FACT IT IS EVER RECONVENED.

Q. IF SALT DOESN'T WORK OUT, HOW WOULD THE FURTHER COOLING OF RELATIONS MANIFEST ITSELF?

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A. FAILING AN AGREEMENT ON SALT, WE WOULD HAVE TO SEEK OTHER WAYS TO SAFEGUARD OUR SECURITY ON BOTH SIDES. THIS I THINK WOULD AT LEAST BE THE BEGINNING OF UNLEASHING THE ARMS RACE. IT'S IMPORTANT TO POINT OUT THAT EVEN IF WE FAIL TO REACH AGREEMENT BY OCTOBER 3 -- AND I THINK THIS I HIGHLY UNLIKELY GIVEN PRESENT CONDITIONS -- WE SHOULD NOT PANIC. THERE'S NO REASON FOR US TO ASSUME THAT THAT MEANS THE END OF THE WORLD, OF NEGOTIATIONS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF IN FACT WE ARE TALKING AT THE TIME, THEN THERE MUST BE SOME MECHANISM WE CAN FIND TO AT LEAST ASSUME THAT SALT-I WOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT AND THAT WE DON'T HAVE TO RESORT TO EXTREME MEASURES.

Q. SO YOUSEE SOME SORT OF CONTINUATION OF DETENTE AT A SLOWER PACE, RATHER THAN REVERSION TO THE COLD WAR?

A. IN THE INITIAL PHASE, YES. I DON'T KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE GO WITHOUT A SALT AGREEMENT FOR SAY THE NEXT SIX MONTHS OR A YEAR. THEN I THINK THERE'S A REAL RISK OF GOING BACK TO CERTAINLY THE TENSIONS OF THE COLD WAR IF NOT THE

ATMOSPHERE.

Q. HOW DO YOU ASSESS SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARD, CHINA, YUGOSLAVIA AFTER TITO, AND OTHER WORLD TROUBLE SPOTS?

A. I HAVE ALWAYS FELT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ENGAGE IN ADVENTURISM AROUND THE WORLD, WHEREVER THEY FELT THEY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY OF DOING SO WITH IMPUNITY.

ON THE QUESTION OF YUGOSLAVIA, I THINK WHAT HAPPENS THERE DEPENDS IN LARGE MEASURE ON THE YUGOSLAVS THEMSELVES. MY OWN FEELING ON THE BASIS OF MY EXPERIENCE THERE (AS US AMBASSADOR) IS THAT THE YUGOSLAVS ARE SO PASSIONATELY DEVOTED TO THEIR INDEPENDENCE THAT THEY WILL BURY THEIR VERY DEEP DIFFERENCES
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IN ORDER TO GET SAFELY THROUGH THE TRANSITION PERIOD. IF THEY DO THIS, THEY WILL NOT PROVIDE THE SORT OF OPPORTUNITIES THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE SEEKING IN THE POST TITO PERIOD. IF THE COUNTRY AVOIDS THE SORT OF DISINTEGRATION THAT WOULD PROVIDE THOSE OPPORTUNITIES THEN I THINK YUGOSLAVIA IS SAFE. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY CONTEMPLATE POLITICAL MOVES IN THE POST-TITO PERIOD RATHER THAN MILITARY MOVES AND IF THE YUGOSLAVS BEHAVE IN SUCH A WAY THAT THOSE POLITICAL MOVES DO NOT SEEM TO BE AVAILABLE, THEN I THINK YUGOSLAVIA WILL REMAIN SAFE.

ON THE QUESTION OF CHINA, I THINK AS THE RECENT PRESS OUTBURSTS HAVE INDICATED, RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING ARE JUST ABOUT AS BAD AS THEY'VE EVER BEEN. BUT I DON'T THINK THIS MEANS HOSTILITIES ARE IMMINENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. WAY DOWN THE ROAD WHEN THE CHINESE FEEL PERHAPS IN A BETTER MILITARY BALANCE WITH THE SOVIETS THAN THEY SEEM TO BE NOW, PERHAPS THERE WILL BE A RATHER DANGEROUS SITUATION DEVELOPING. AT THE PRESENT TIME I THINK YOU SIMPLY HAVE A CONTINUATION OF POLEMICS, OPEN HOSTILITY IN STATEMENTS AND GOVERNMENT POSITIONS BUT WITHOUT ANY REAL RISK OF HOSTILITIES ALONG THE BORDERS.

Q. HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE YOUR PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH SOVIET LEADERS, STARTING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO?

A. WHILE I DISAGREE WITH ALMOST EVERYTHING GROMYKO SAYS, I HAVE GREAT ADMIRATION FOR THE MAN AS A PROFESSIONAL. MY OWN RELATIONS WITH HIM SINCE I'VE BEEN IN MOSCOW HAVE BEEN CORRECT AND EVEN FRIENDLY AT TIMES. I HAVE SEEN HIM PRIVATELY ON THREE OCCASIONS AND OF COURSE I GOT TO KNOW HIM RATHER WELL DURING SECRETARY OF STATE VANCE'S TALKS HERE AND IN GENEVA. HE'S APPROACHABLE, BUT BECAUSE OF HIS POLITBURO STATUS HE'S A MAN WITH VERY HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY ON HIS SHOULDERS. EVEN AS THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR I AM NOT APT TO DEVELOP THE SORT

OF CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH HIM THAT FOR EXAMPLE IS
POSSIBLE IN OTHER CAPITALS. I HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL SO FAR IN
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ESTABLISHING A PERSONAL RAPPORT WITH MANY OTHERS IN THE LEADERSHIP.
WITH SOME OF THE MINISTERS YES, BUT I'M TALKING ABOUT THE TOP
PARTY PERSONALITIES. I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO SEE THE MINISTER
OF DEFENSE NOW FOR ABOUT SIX WEEKS. THE WORD HAS COME DOWN TO
ME THAT HE IS TERRIBLY BUSY AND WOULD NOT POSSIBLY BE ABLE TO
FIT ME IN FOR TEN OR FIFTEEN MINUTES. I FIND THIS VERY HARD
TO BELIEVE. IT IS TRUE THAT THEIR SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS IS
TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM OURS. BUT I THINK FRANKLY IT SHOULD BE
POSSIBLE IN THESE DANGEROUS TIMES FOR THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR
TO MOSCOW TO HAVE SOME SORT OF CONNECTION WITH ALL OF THE TOP
PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY AND PARTICULARLY THOSE DEALING
WITH FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE MATTERS. SO I AM GOING TO
CONTINUE TO HAMMER AWAY AT THIS AND WE MAY HAVE SOME SUCCESS.

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9817

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 MOSCOW 10117

Q. WHAT IS IT LIKE TO SIT ACROSS THE NEGOTIATING TABLE
FROM MR. BREZHNEV?

A. HE'S A MAN THAT CONVEYS A REAL FEELING OF POWER AND
THAT IN ITSELF CAN BE SOMEWHAT INTIMIDATING. HE'S ALSO
A MAN, UNLIKE MANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES, WITH A SENSE OF HUMOR
WHICH IS VERY HELPFUL IN CERTAIN SITUATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE WHEN,
AS OUR PRESS PUT IT, HE HAS BEEN LECTURING ME, TO HAVE HIM
MAKE A QUIP. IT SORT OF RELIEVES THE SITUATION A BIT. I

THINK IT'S A HELPFUL WAY TO PROCEED.

Q. CAN YOU GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF A QUIP?

A. IN THIS LAST MEETING WITH HIM, HE SEEMED TO BE SORELY DISAPPOINTED THAT I HAD GIVEN UP SMOKING A NUMBER OF YEARS AGO. HE SAID HE LIKES TO HAVE PEOPLE AROUND HIM WHO SMOKE SO HE CAN SNIFF WITHOUT ACTUALLY INHALING IT HIMSELF. THAT'S THE SORT OF LIGHT TOUCH WHICH IS HELPFUL TO RELIEVE THE ATMOSPHERE.

Q. HOW WILL SOVIET POLICY CHANGE AFTER BREZHNEV?

A. I THINK THAT SOVIET POLICY FOR THE MOST PART IS DICTATED BY WHAT THE MARXISTS THEMSELVES CALL OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS. AND OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS AT THE PRESENT TIME CALL FOR SOME MEASURE OF DETENTE, SOME MEASURE OF RELAXATION OF TENSIONS. THE WORLD
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IS SIMPLY TOO DANGEROUS WITH THE GREAT ARSENALS THAT WE AND THE SOVIETS HAVE AT OUR COMMAND TO PURSUE ANY OTHER COURSE. SO I DON'T THINK IT WILL REALLY MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE WHO SUCCEEDS BREZHNEV, OR THE MAN AFTER BREZHNEV IN TERMS OF BASIC SOVIET POLICY. THERE MAY BE VARYING DEGREES OF ADVENTURISM IN POLICY, DEPENDING ON WHO'S IN THE SADDLE, BUT THE BASIC THRUST WILL REMAIN THE SAME AS IT IS TODAY. THEREFORE I DON'T THINK ITS TOO USEFUL TO SPECULATE ON WHO MIGHT SUCCEED BREZHNEV. THE GENERAL ASSUMPTION IS THAT (ANDREI) KIRILENKO WILL TAKE OVER FROM BREZHNEV ON A CARETAKER BASIS BUT THEN SOMEBODY IN THE YOUNGER GENERATION WOULD MOVE UP. BUT SE DON'T REALLY HAVE A FIX ON WHO THOSE PEOPLE MIGHT BE.

Q. WHAT IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO INFLUENCE SOVIET BEHAVIOR ON HUMAN RIGHTS?

A. I THINK FRANKLY THE SORT OF POSTURE THAT WE'VE ASSUMED IN RECENT MONTHS I PRECISELY THE RIGHT ONE. THAT IS TO EXPRESS OUR POSITION WITH A GOOD DEAL OF CANDOR AND A GOOD DEAL OF SENSITIVITY TO OTHER NATIONS' CONCERNS, TRY TO EXPLAIN WHY IT IS WE ARE SO GENUINELY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND EXPLAIN AS WELL THAT THIS POLICY IS NOT AIMED AT ANY ONE COUNTRY OR AT ANY ONE SYSTEM. I THINK THIS IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT HERE IN MOSCOW WHERE THE SOVIETS HAVE A SUSPICION, WHICH IS HARD TO DISLODGE, THAT THE PRESIDENT'S CAMPAIGN IS AIMED AT UNDERMINING SOVIET POWER INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION AND IN EASTERN EUROPE AS WELL. I THINK THE TACTICS FOLLOWED BY PRESIDENT CARTER AND SECRETARY VANCE IN RECENT MONTHS ARE CALCULATED TO EXPLAIN OUR REAL OBJECTIVES. WHETHER IN ACT WE WILL HAVE ANY IMPACT ON BASIC SOVIET BEHAVIOR, YOUR GUESS IS AS GOOD AS MINE. WE HAVEN'T SEEN ANY POSIIVE EVIDENCE OF THAT SO FAR. BUT ALL THAT IS BESIDE THE POINT.

I THINK THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE PRESIDENT,
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REFLECTING THE GUT FEELINGS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,
IS VERY DEEPLY COMMITTED TO THIS CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
TO AVOIDING THEIR VIOLATIONS WHEREVER THIS MAY OCCUR.

Q. SOVIET OFFICIALS SAY THE PRESIDENT'S HUMAN RIGHTS
POSTURE INTERFERES IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND POISONS
THE DETENTE CLIMATE. DISSIDENTS LIKE ANDREI SAKHAROV WANT THE
PRESIDENT TO SPEAK OUT MORE ON SPECIFIC CASES. WHAT IS
THE PROPER BALANCE?

A. PRECISELY THE SORT OF THING THAT WE'VE BEEN DOING
RECENTLY, SINCE MR. CARTER CAME INTO OFFICE. NO MATTER WHAT YOU
DO YOU ARE GOING TO BE CONDEMNED BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER.
CERTAINLY I CAN UNDERSTAND THE VIEWPOINT OF THE DISSIDENTS IN
THINKING THEIR SAFETY SOMEHOW OR OTHER IS IMPROVED IF WE
TAKE A MORE VIGOROUS LINE IN THEIR CAUSE. BUT WE JUST HAVE TO
DO WHAT WE THINK IS RIGHT, AND DO IT IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT
WILL NOT SERIOUSLY FRAY OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, AND IN SUCH
A WAY THAT THE PLIGHT OF THE DISSIDENTS THEMSELVES WILL NOT BE
WORSENER. AND I THINK, FRANKLY, THAT'S PRECISELY WHAT WE HAVE
DONE AND ARE DOING. (END TEXT)

3. NOTE: SINCE INTERVIEW CANNOT APPEAR BEFORE JULY 18 AT
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